Under the Labour Codes, especially the Social Security Code, the definition of Gig and Platform workers includes a statement which says, ‘outside of a traditional employer-employee relationship’. This means that workers obtaining employment through a digital medium, which is owned by an entity, cannot be considered an employee or workman of that entity. Thus, these gig workers are bound by contractual relationship with their platform employer and also, these are not eligible to get the benefits that accrue to other regular employees who are typically bound by employer-employee relationship.

In this regulatory backdrop where gig and platform workers are expressly recognised under the Labour Codes, particularly the Code on Social Security, the scale and significance of the gig economy in India assumes particular importance. Acknowledging the structural shift in employment arrangements facilitated by digital platforms, NITI Aayog, in its policy paper on India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy, has characterised the gig workforce as a key driver of a new economic paradigm. Leveraging India’s vast demographic dividend, rapid urbanisation and widespread adoption of digital technologies, the study estimates that approximately 77 lakh (7.7 million) workers were engaged in the gig economy in 2020–21. Further, the gig and platform workforce is projected to expand substantially, reaching nearly 2.35 crore (23.5 million) workers by 2029–30.

Besides above, the Code has prescribed social security norms for the gig workers wherein it is empowered central government to frame the following schemes:

1. Life & disability cover
2. Accident insurance
3. Health & maternity benefits
4. Old age protection
5. Crèche
6. Any other benefit as determined by the Central Government.

Each scheme can specify administration, implementing agency, aggregator role, funding sources, etc. These schemes are to be financed by the Central and State Governments. More importantly, aggregators are also required to contribute 1%–2% of annual turnover, subject to the limit of 5% of the amount paid/payable to gig/platform workers. Under the Code, it is also mentioned that the central government would constitute the National Social Security Board to take care of the welfare of the gig/ platform workers, which has an equal number of representatives of aggregators and gig workers, besides other members of PF and ESI. There are indications that gig, and platform workers can be included in the ESI and PF ecosystem, which already covers a large population of workers in terms of health and life insurance, pension, etc.  The Code allows the appropriate government to set up toll-free helpline/facilitation centres to disseminate scheme info and facilitate registration, etc., for unorganised/gig/platform workers.

Proposals under Draft Rules of Social Security Code

Registration of Gig/ Platform Workers

Under the draft rules, every aggregator is required to register the gig/ platform workers on the portal of the central government or gig workers themselves can register by making an application seeded with their Aadhaar number. Besides this, state governments are also required to maintain the data of gig/ platform workers electronically. The portal of the central government shall generate a unique registration number, which can be downloaded from the portal itself in the form of a digital card, having a photograph and other details of the gig worker. The Code requires the aggregators to share and submit the details of gig/platform workers every quarter on the portal of the central government.

Eligibility/ ineligibility of the Gig/ Platform Workers of Schemes

1. In the absence of registration on the portal, the schemes of the central government shall not be available to the concerned unregistered gig/ platform worker, and besides, the Draft Rules extend such ineligibility to non-updation of the details of the registered gig/ platform worker.    
2. Even the registered gig/ platform worker is ineligible unless he/ she has been engaged as such for a minimum of 90 days and in case of engagement with multiple aggregators, then he/ she must be engaged for a minimum period of 120 days in the last financial year.

There is one explanation to quantify the ‘engagement days’ of 90/120 days Rule which is as follows:

1. A day counts if the worker earned any income that day (amount irrelevant)
2. Multi-aggregator days are cumulative
3. If engaged with 3 aggregators on the same day, it counts as 3 days.
3. Moreover, the Government, while framing any scheme for Gig/ Platform Workers will set-out the more eligibility criteria besides above.

Shortcomings from a practicality / implementation angle

1. Non-Updation of the details of the registration

A Gig/ Platform Worker who is registered with any or all of the aggregators and also registered on the portal of the central government but for any reason has not update his/ her details, renders him/ her ineligible to the benefits of the government sponsored scheme may not be good idea and the proposal works against the objective of the social security code. Further, the Code principally restricts the ineligibility to the non-registration of the worker on the government’s portal.

2. Strict 90/120-day engagement rule

The 90/120-day engagement rule is a major filter since Seasonal/part-time/low-frequency gig/ platform workers may remain outside coverage. Counting “engagement days” based on any income can be gamed (micro-tasks to qualify) while also excluding those with longer hours but fewer “income days” depending on platform payout design.
Further, the 90/ 120 days engagement rule is to be considered for the last financial year but not the current financial year, which will make him/ her ineligible in the current year even after serving any aggregator for the full 365 days. For example, a Gig/ platform worker served less than 90/ 120 days in the FY 2025-26, then, his life, health, accident insurance, etc. is not taken care of by any of the government schemes made for Gig/ platform workers in the next (i.e. FY 2026-27). This requirement has to be fulfilled in every financial year to prove his eligibility to the schemes.
This is contrary to the scheme (PF/ ESI) framed for regular employees whose life and health insurance is protected from day one when they become members of any of these corporations.

3. No protection against the abrupt termination of Gig/ platform workers

The Code on Social Security does not provide for any grievance redressal mechanism or procedural safeguards against the abrupt or unilateral termination of gig and platform workers by aggregators, thereby rendering such workers contractually vulnerable. This legislative omission runs contrary to the stated objective of extending social security to a workforce expressly recognised under the Code. In contrast, certain State legislations have adopted a more proactive approach by mandating grievance redressal frameworks, including the filing of complaints either in person before an Internal Dispute Resolution Committee to be constituted by every registered aggregator or platform, or through a designated web portal, the link to which is required to be made available on the platform application of such aggregators, thereby extending minimum procedural protections to gig workers without disturbing their non-employee status.

In a podcast given by a CEO of one of the quick commerce platforms stated that on an average around 5,000 gig workers on monthly basis get terminated from his platform and around 1.5-2.00 Lacs gig workers on monthly basis leave his platform voluntarily. There is no provision either in code or draft rules about the protection against illegal termination and forceful resignation. Further, the draft rules provide for sharing of gig workers data on quarterly basis on the portal of central government but there is no requirement of sharing data of gig workers who left the platform and status of the complaints if any received or disposed during the reporting period.

4. No clarity on the contribution under State Laws passed recently on the welfare and protection of the Gig/ platform workers

The Karnataka and Rajasthan enactments¹ mandate the constitution of a Gig and Platform Workers’ Welfare Fund, to be financed through welfare fees, contributions from gig workers, and grants from the State and Central Governments. The welfare fee by the State of Karnataka is prescribed as a percentage of the payout to platform-based gig workers in each transaction, subject to a statutory floor of not less than 1% (one percent) and a ceiling of not more than 5% (five percent), as may be notified by the respective State Governments. However, the statutes do not clearly specify whether this welfare fee is intended to be borne by the aggregator as an additional statutory levy or deducted from the earnings payable to gig workers.

This ambiguity arises from the statutory reference to “every payment made to gig workers and the welfare fee deducted by the platform,” which, if interpreted to permit deduction from worker payouts, would directly reduce their daily earnings and adversely impact livelihoods. In contrast, the Code on Social Security places the contribution obligation on aggregators, requiring them to contribute between 1 – 2% (one to two percent) of their annual turnover, subject to an overall cap of 5% (Five percent) of the total payments made or payable to gig workers, thereby highlighting a structural divergence between the Central framework and the State enactments on contribution incidence.

Conclusion

While the Labour Codes mark an important step in formally recognising gig and platform workers and extending a framework for social security, significant gaps remain in their practical implementation. Rigid eligibility thresholds, absence of termination-related safeguards, and ambiguities around contribution mechanisms—particularly under recent State enactments—dilute the protective intent of the law. The divergence between the Central and State frameworks further adds to compliance uncertainty. Addressing these issues through clearer rules, harmonisation, and worker-centric safeguards will be critical to ensuring that the social security regime meaningfully responds to the realities of India’s rapidly expanding gig economy.