Nov 16, 2026

SME IPO Market Access: The Regulatory Balance Behind SEBI’s 2026 Proposals

Share on

SEBI’s October 2026 consultation reflects a broader recalibration of the SME IPO framework, moving beyond restrictive entry and trading requirements towards safeguards more closely aligned with issuer size, financial strength and investor participation. The significance of these proposals lies not merely in expanding market access or reducing compliance costs, but in whether the safeguards retained or strengthened can adequately address the risks arising from a more accessible and increasingly diverse SME market.

In March 2025, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) increased the minimum application amount for an initial public offering (“IPO”) by a small and medium enterprise (“SME”) from ₹1 lakh to more than ₹2 lakh, seeking to limit smaller investors’ exposure to the heightened risks associated with SME investments. However, SEBI’s consultation paper dated 14 October 2026 (“Consultation Paper”) proposes a minimum application value of at least ₹1 lakh and, more significantly, permits secondary-market trading in a single share. Viewed in isolation, these proposals appear to be a reversal of the restrictive approach adopted in 2025. However, the Consultation Paper presents a more nuanced regulatory approach. While proposing to ease restrictions on investor participation and secondary-market trading, SEBI also seeks to strengthen certain safeguards through higher profitability requirements, a broader minimum allottee base and greater institutional participation in specified IPOs. The underlying shift is therefore not simply towards greater market access, but towards reconsidering which restrictions remain necessary and which safeguards can more effectively address the risks associated with SME investments.

The 2025 amendments were introduced in response to specific concerns identified by SEBI in November 2024. These included concentrated promoter shareholding, diversion of IPO proceeds to connected entities and companies reporting inflated revenues through circular transactions with related parties. At the same time, investor interest in SME IPOs had increased sharply, with the number of applicants for every successful allottee rising from approximately 4 times in FY 2021–22 to 245 times in FY 2023–24. This growing demand, coupled with concerns over the financial practices of certain issuers, highlighted the need for stronger investor protection. SEBI accordingly introduced stricter eligibility requirements for companies seeking SME listings, placed additional restrictions on how IPO proceeds could be used and increased the minimum investment required to participate in an SME IPO.

While the concerns that prompted the 2025 amendments remain relevant, the Consultation Paper also recognizes that the SME market has expanded considerably since its regulatory framework was first introduced. As of 31 July 2026, a total of 1,496 companies had listed on the SME platforms, collectively raising ₹40,222 crore through IPOs, while 365 companies had subsequently migrated to the Main Board. These figures reflect not only the growing use of SME platforms for raising public capital but also their role in supporting companies as they expand and eventually move to the Main Board. With the SME market now accommodating companies of varying sizes, valuations and capital requirements, SEBI is reconsidering whether rules originally designed for smaller enterprises remain appropriate for the wider range of businesses seeking to access the SME market today.

The distinction is apparent when listing routes are tested against two illustrative issuers. The first issuer has post-issue paid-up capital of ₹8 crore and estimated market capitalization of ₹3,000 crore. It must access the SME Platform under the existing framework; the proposal would instead permit a choice between the SME Platform and the Main Board. The second issuer has post-issue paid-up capital of ₹30 crores but an estimated market capitalization of ₹800 crore. At present, it is excluded from the SME Platform and must pursue a Main Board IPO. Under the proposed framework, it would be required to use the SME Platform, subject to other applicable eligibility conditions. Together, these examples show how nominal paid-up capital can determine an issuer’s listing route irrespective of economic valuation, the mismatch that SEBI seeks to address through market-capitalization-based eligibility.

That mismatch is not confined to eligibility. As SEBI explains in the Consultation Paper, requirements governing minimum applications, allotments, trading lots, underwriting, compulsory market making and migration also warrant reconsideration.

The purpose of the Consultation Paper is therefore neither to remove every SME-specific safeguard nor to apply the Main Board framework uniformly. It seeks to retain safeguards that address SME-specific risks while simplifying or aligning other requirements with the Main Board framework where doing so can reduce unnecessary costs and barriers to participation. The central question is not merely whether the regulatory framework should be tightened or relaxed, but whether the existing requirements continue to serve their intended purpose and whether the proposed changes can achieve those objectives more effectively.

Key Changes Proposed: What, why, and to what end?

The Consultation Paper proposes several changes to the existing SME IPO framework under Chapter IX of the ICDR Regulations, covering eligibility requirements, investor participation, utilization of IPO proceeds, shareholder exits, underwriting, trading and migration to the Main Board. The table below summarizes the key proposals, compares them with the existing regulatory requirements, and explains the concerns identified by SEBI and how the proposed changes seek to address them.

Table 1. Access to the SME market, financial eligibility and shareholder exits

Subject and provision Existing framework Proposed framework Problem identified by SEBI What the proposal seeks to achieve
Eligibility for the SME Platform — Regulation 229(1) and Regulation 229(2) Eligibility is based on the issuer’s post-issue paid-up capital.

·   Regulation 229(1) covers issuers with post-issue paid-up capital up to ₹10 crore

·   Regulation 229(2) also permits issuers with post-issue paid-up capital above ₹10 crore and up to ₹25 crore to opt for the SME route.

SEBI proposes replacing post-issue paid-up capital with post-issue market capitalization, calculated at the offer price.

·   Regulation 229(1) – An issuer valued at up to ₹1,000 crore would be required to use the SME Platform

·   Regulation 229(2) – An issuer valued above ₹1,000 crore and up to ₹4,000 crore could choose between the SME Platform and Mainboard

Reassessment at RHP/prospectus stage: If an issuer’s estimated post-issue market capitalization exceeds ₹4,000 crore, it must be refiled under the Main Board framework. Conversely, a Main Board issuer whose valuation falls to ₹1,000 crore or below must be refiled under the SME framework.

Paid-up capital reflects the nominal value of issued shares, which may not adequately reflect the company’s economic size, valuation and true value and growth potential of issuer.

This can place an issuer outside the SME framework even where its business is more suited to that platform.

SEBI also notes that issuers may undertake capital restructuring, including bonus issues, merely to meet paid-up capital thresholds, incurring additional costs, tax burden and compliance without changing the underlying business.

The proposal seeks to make the listing route more closely reflect the company’s economic scale and equity valuation, rather than its nominal capital structure.

This reduces the need for restructuring undertaken solely to meet capital thresholds and retain a choice of platform for issuers within the specified intermediate valuation range.

Indian Accounting Standards (“Ind AS”) reporting for larger SME issuers — proposed proviso to Regulation 229(2) Regulation 229(2) does not mandate preparing  the financial statements as per Ind AS. Issuers valued above ₹1,000 crore and up to ₹4,000 crore, choosing the SME Platform, would be required to present restated consolidated financial statements prepared under Ind AS for the preceding three financial years and any stub period. Allowing relatively larger issuers to choose the SME Platform raises the question of whether the existing financial reporting requirements are appropriate for businesses of their scale and complexity. Preserve flexibility in choosing the SME Platform while requiring larger issuers to present more comparable and consistent financial information through Ind AS, without extending this additional requirement to smaller issuers.
IPO eligibility following conversion or business reorganization — Regulation 229(4) An issuer converted from a proprietorship, partnership firm or limited liability partnership (“LLP”) must have completed at least one full financial year in corporate form before filing its draft offer document. Replace this with four completed consecutive quarters and require post-conversion or reorganization audited financial statements to be filed with the RoC.

This would also cover acquisitions, transfers and other reorganizations where businesses taken over from proprietorships, partnerships or LLPs account for more than 50% of the issuer’s latest annual revenue.

The requirement to complete a full financial year can produce substantially different waiting periods depending on the conversion date. SEBI illustrates that conversion on 1 April may entail approximately 12 months’ waiting, while conversion immediately afterwards may entail almost 24 months.

Similar business transfers may also escape the requirement merely because they are structured differently.

Ensure a uniform waiting period and consistent treatment of conversions and business takeovers, while preserving financial disclosures and recognizing the business’s earlier operating history.
Operating-profit eligibility — Regulation 229(6) An issuer must have operating profits of at least ₹1 crore in two of the preceding three financial years. SEBI proposes replacing this requirement with average annual operating profit of at least ₹3 crore over the preceding three financial years, based on restated consolidated financial statements. SEBI considers that existing threshold may no longer reflect the financial capacity expected of an SME issuer seeking public capital. Testing profits separately each year may also fail to capture overall performance where earnings fluctuate. Set a higher profitability benchmark while assessing performance over three years, providing a more meaningful financial safeguard for investors and greater alignment with the Main Board framework.
Alternative eligibility route for issuers not meeting the profit requirement — proposed Regulation 229(7) Unlike the Main Board framework under Regulation 6(2), Chapter IX does not provide an alternative eligibility route for SME issuers that fail to meet the prescribed profitability requirement. Permit such issuers to undertake a book-built IPO with at least 75% of the net offer allotted to QIBs.

Other eligibility requirements under Regulations 229(3), 229(4) and 229(5) would continue to apply.

The proposed higher profitability threshold may exclude established, growth-oriented businesses whose profits remain below the prescribed level because of investments in expansion and development, despite having an adequate operating track record. Introduce an alternative route similar to that available for Main Board IPOs, allowing established businesses to access public capital through substantial QIB participation, while retaining safeguards relating to operating history and business and promoter continuity.
Use of issue proceeds for general corporate purposes — Regulation 230(2) The amount earmarked for general corporate purposes (“GCP”) in the draft offer document and offer document cannot exceed 15% of the amount being raised by the issuer or ₹10 crore, whichever is lower. SEBI proposes removing the ₹10 crore ceiling while retaining the 15% limit. The maximum GCP allocation would therefore be determined by the amount raised by the issuer. The fixed ₹10 crore ceiling restricts larger SME IPOs, even where their corporate funding needs increase with the size of the business and issue. Provide greater flexibility in using IPO proceeds for general corporate needs, while retaining the 15% limit as a safeguard against excessive allocation to GCP.
Offer for sale by existing shareholders — existing Regulations 230(1)(f) and 230(1)(g); proposed Regulation 230A The offer for sale (“OFS”) cannot exceed 20% of the total issue size, and each selling shareholder cannot sell more than 50% of its pre-issue shareholding. Introduce a one-year minimum holding period before draft filing, subject to exemptions as Mainboard framework. Remove both OFS limits for QIB selling shareholders, except in IPOs under proposed Regulation 229(7). Other selling shareholders would remain subject to these limits. Applicable limits would also account for secondary sales between draft filing and issue opening. The existing framework restricts the size of exits but does not prescribe a general one-year holding period for shares offered through an SME IPO. It may therefore permit recently acquired shares to be sold to public investors while limiting exits by institutional investors that have remained invested for longer. SEBI also recognizes that restrictive exit opportunities can discourage institutional investment before an IPO. The proposal seeks to make IPO exits more workable for longer-term institutional investors and thereby support their willingness to fund growing SMEs. The holding-period requirement would address short-term acquisitions made primarily for an IPO exit.
Lock-in of pre-IPO shareholdings — Regulations 238 and 239 Minimum promoters’ contribution: Three years from IPO allotment or commencement of commercial production, whichever is later. Excess promoter holdings: 50% locked in for two years and the remaining 50% for one year. Non-promoter holdings: Generally, one year from IPO allotment, subject to exemptions. Retain the three-year lock-in for minimum promoters’ contribution, calculated only from IPO allotment.

Reduce excess promoter holdings to one year and other pre-IPO holdings to six months, while prescribing one year for promoter-group holdings, subject to the minimum-contribution requirement and applicable exemptions.

Permit depositories to mark securities as non-transferable where ordinary lock-in cannot be implemented.

Linking the minimum-contribution lock-in to commercial production can extend the restriction beyond the period calculated from IPO allotment. The staggered release of excess promoter holdings adds complexity, while ordinary non-promoter pre-IPO investors face longer restrictions than under the corresponding Main Board framework. Simplify lock-in requirements and facilitate earlier exits for pre-IPO investors, while retaining longer restrictions for promoters and promoter-group shareholders to ensure continued commitment and prevent circumvention.

 

The proposals discussed above concern eligibility for an SME IPO, the use of funds raised and the treatment of existing shareholders. The review also extends to how the IPO is conducted and how its shares trade after listing. SEBI proposes changes to investor applications and allotments, underwriting, market making and migration to the Main Board, alongside revisions to offer-document and issue procedures. The following table explains these changes, the concerns behind them and their intended outcomes.

While the first set of proposals addresses which businesses can access the SME Platform and how capital raising and shareholder exits are structured, the second focuses on how investors participate in an IPO and how securities trade after listing. SEBI seeks to lower participation and transaction costs, simplify allotment and reduce compulsory intermediary arrangements, while placing greater reliance on actual investor demand and broader market participation. The following changes reflect this balance between easier market access and safeguards for successful issue completion.

Table 2. Application, allotment and trading

Subject and provision Existing framework Proposed framework Problem identified by SEBI What the proposal seeks to achieve
Minimum IPO application — Regulation 267 An application must comprise at least two lots, with a value above ₹2 lakh. Minimum four lots, each worth at least ₹25,000, giving a minimum application value of at least ₹1 lakh. The higher entry amount unnecessarily restricts retail participation when other proposed safeguards seek to address the risks of SME investment. Broaden investor access while retaining a meaningful minimum application amount, rather than permitting unrestricted small applications.
Investor allocation — Regulation 253 Book-built issues generally allocate at least 35% to individuals applying for the minimum application size, at least 15% to non-institutional investors (“NIIs”) and up to 50% to QIBs. Retain these percentages for the ordinary route, using the retail individual investor (“RII”) category.

Under Regulation 229(7), allocate at least 75% to QIBs, no more than 10% to RIIs and 15% to NIIs. Expressly permit anchors to receive up to 60% of the QIB portion.

The existing investor categories differ from the Main Board framework, while anchor investor allocation is not expressly provided.

A separate allocation structure is also needed for issuers using the proposed alternative profitability route.

Align investor classification with the Main Board framework and facilitate anchor participation, while ensuring greater institutional participation in IPOs.
Minimum allottees and allotment — Regulation 268 An SME IPO requires at least 200 allottees. Allotment is linked to the prescribed minimum application size and lot multiples. Increase the minimum to 500 allottees. Retail investors would receive at least one minimum lot, subject to availability, with additional shares allotted proportionately without requiring lot multiples. The existing allottee threshold permits relatively concentrated ownership, while rigid lot-based allotment restricts flexibility. Broaden the distribution of shares among investors and make allotment more flexible, without reducing the minimum IPO application requirement.
Underwriting — Regulation 260 The entire IPO must be 100% underwritten, with lead managers underwriting at least 15% on their own account. Remove these blanket requirements and adopt Main Board-style rules distinguishing rejection-related underwriting from optional under-subscription cover. Full underwriting imposes costs even where investor demand is sufficient. SEBI identifies underwriting fees as a substantial component of issue expenses. Reduce fundraising costs while retaining applicable underwriting protections.
Minimum subscription — existing Regulation 264(5); proposed Regulation 265A Before announcing issue closure, the lead manager must be satisfied, supported by the registrar’s certificate, that at least 90% of the offer has been subscribed. Replace with an express 90% minimum subscription requirement, subject to the OFS exception and applicable public-offer conditions. If unmet, refund application money promptly and no later than four days after closure. With compulsory underwriting proposed to be removed, the framework needs a clear minimum-subscription requirement to ensure that an IPO is not completed without sufficient investor demand. Make successful completion of an SME IPO conditional on achieving minimum subscription.
Compulsory market making — Regulation 261 SME IPOs require compulsory market making for at least three years, with market makers maintaining an inventory of at least 5% of the securities proposed to be listed at allotment. Remove compulsory market making, including the associated inventory and mandatory arrangements. Issuers bear these costs even where market makers contribute only a small share of trading activity. The proposed one-share lot also changes the basis for requiring universal market-making support and maintaining liquidity. Reduce regulatory and operating costs and enable liquidity to develop through wider investor participation and normal market trading, rather than mandatory market-making arrangements.

 

Beyond these changes, SEBI proposes market-capitalization-based migration to the Main Board, optional where an issuer is valued at ₹1,000 crore or more but below ₹4,000 crore, and mandatory at ₹4,000 crore or more, subject to Main Board eligibility. Reverse migration would be discontinued. Other changes include prescribing a price-band cap of between 105% and 120% of the floor price for book-built issues. The proposed transition would permit issuers filing during the first three months after notification to choose between the existing and revised frameworks, with separate arrangements for pending issues and existing SME-listed companies. The changes to trading lots and market making would take effect through a separate SEBI circular.

The Questions Beyond the Proposed Relaxations

The proposed framework seeks to remove restrictions that may no longer be necessary while retaining safeguards appropriate to SME issuers. The difficulty lies in ensuring that the requirements being introduced or retained can address the risks associated with those being relaxed. Several issues merit consideration before the framework is finalized.

Can changes in IPO pricing affect the choice of listing platform? SEBI proposes reassessing platform eligibility at the RHP stage and requiring an issuer to refile under a different framework if its valuation crosses the prescribed thresholds. However, in a book-built IPO, the final issue price is determined only after bidding. An issuer whose price band falls on either side of a threshold could therefore face uncertainty over the applicable listing framework. Should eligibility be tested at the floor price, the upper end of the price band or the final issue price? SEBI should clarify the applicable valuation methodology, the consequences of subsequent price changes and whether completed regulatory scrutiny and due diligence can be carried forward where refiling becomes necessary.

Should larger issuers choosing the SME Platform be subject to different corporate governance requirements? The proposed framework permits issuers valued above ₹1,000 crore and up to ₹4,000 crore to choose between the SME Platform and the Main Board. However, under Regulation 15(2)(b) of the LODR Regulations, SME-listed companies are generally exempt from several corporate governance requirements applicable to Main Board companies, including those relating to board composition, board committees and corporate governance reporting, subject to specified exceptions. Although related-party transaction requirements apply to qualifying SME-listed companies, other governance differences remain. The proposed Ind AS requirement addresses financial reporting but does not bridge these differences. This raises the question: should larger companies be subject to comparable corporate governance standards based on their size, irrespective of whether they choose to list on the SME Platform or the Main Board?

Can institutional participation provide sufficient protection under the alternative IPO route? The proposed framework allows issuers that do not meet the profitability requirement to undertake an IPO with at least 75% allotment to QIBs, while also requiring a minimum of 500 allottees. Although these requirements seek to ensure institutional participation and wider shareholding, meeting both may be challenging for smaller IPOs. Further, institutional demand does not replace the need for proper due diligence and reliable financial disclosures. SEBI should therefore consider whether these requirements can operate effectively together without unnecessarily restricting access to the alternative route.

Will one-share trading ensure sufficient liquidity in SME securities? SEBI proposes removing compulsory market making to reduce issuer costs, while permitting trading in a single share to encourage wider participation. However, allowing smaller transactions does not ensure that buyers and sellers will always be available. Further, limited trading activity by market makers does not necessarily mean that their role in supporting liquidity is insignificant. Should SEBI therefore consider additional safeguards or monitoring arrangements for SME securities where trading remains limited after compulsory market making is withdrawn?

When must an SME-listed company migrate to the Main Board? SEBI proposes mandatory migration when an issuer’s market capitalization reaches ₹4,000 crore, subject to Main Board eligibility. However, the proposed valuation test applies only on the date of the migration application, without specifying when the company must apply. Could this allow an issuer to delay migration simply by not making an application? The final framework should clarify when the migration obligation arises, prescribe a timeline for compliance and address cases where an issuer meets the valuation threshold but does not satisfy the Main Board’s listing requirements.

Closing Thoughts

SEBI’s October 2026 Consultation Paper signals a broader reconsideration of the role of the SME Platform in India’s capital markets. By moving towards valuation-based eligibility, allowing relatively larger issuers to choose the SME route and relaxing certain fundraising and trading restrictions, the proposals seek to accommodate businesses of different sizes and stages of growth. The SME Platform could therefore evolve beyond being primarily a stepping stone to the Main Board, becoming a more established public-market option for growing enterprises, while retaining a pathway for companies whose scale warrants migration.

This evolution could also change the nature of market participation. Greater flexibility for institutional investment and exits may encourage private capital to support businesses before listing, while lower application requirements and single-share trading could widen retail participation. However, easier access does not necessarily mean lower investment risk or greater liquidity. As the platform accommodates a more diverse range of issuers and investors, the quality of disclosures, continuing governance standards, effective price discovery and availability of trading liquidity will become increasingly important.

The success of the proposed reforms will therefore depend on more than increased IPO activity or reduced compliance costs. It will depend on whether issuers can raise and deploy capital responsibly, investors can participate with adequate information and meaningful exit opportunities, and businesses can graduate to the Main Board through a clear and workable process. The opportunity before SEBI is to develop an SME market that is more accessible and responsive to growing businesses, without compromising the safeguards on which sustained investor confidence depends.

AUTHORED BY

Mr. Ravi Prakash

Associate Partner - Corporate Litigation & Representations

Advocate, Delhi High Court

ravi@indiacp.com

9818598604

Vaibhav Malhotra

Senior Associate

.

vaibhav@indiacp.com

Pranav Verma

Associate

.

pranav@indiacp.com

Arjav Khurkhuriya

Associate

.

arjav@indiacp.com

Request a Call
Scroll